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Abstract
Research & Development (R&D) projects comprise several risk factors. In partic-
ular, they carry two types of uncertainty. Stochastic uncertainty related to the
expected cash flow of the project and probabilistic uncertainty that captures the
likelihood of innovation happen. Furthermore, R&D investments are likely to be
hidden from the market. Sometimes companies choose to disclose the investment at
the moment they make it, sometimes choose to wait for a while after investing, in
some cases they never reveal it in case of failure of the research and in other cases
they choose to signal the will to investing to the market before the investment itself.
The decision to reveal an investment in R&D is a powerful tool that managers hold
to maximize the value of their companies and they have flexibility about the timing
of doing so. Therefore, the decision to do reveal an investment in R&D is an option
for the company that should be exercised in the optimal timing.
We developed a real options model, with three different settings, which aims to
demonstrate that the optimal decision for the moment of revelation varies according
to the parameters of the model. The three settings are: the benchmark setting;
the compound option setting (monopoly and exogenous competition); and the in-
dependent options setting. In the first setting, it is assumed that both options are
a unique one and therefore always exercised at the same time. In the second, it is
considered that the option to reveal the investment is received when the firm invests,
assumption inspired in Delaney and Thijssen (2015). In this setting, we take two
different approaches. In the first one, the firm does not face any competition at all,
so we consider that the firm is enrolled in a monopoly framework. In the second
approach, we assume that there is exogenous competition over the option to reveal
the investment. In the last setting, we abandon the assumption of the compound
option and allow the firm to disclose information before investing if this is the opti-
mal behavior. We show that, depending on the parameters, other strategies can be
better than the benchmark strategy. In addition, we also found theoretical evidence
demonstrating that every time the firm must choose to reveal before investing, the
optimal timing to exercise the option to invest will be anticipated relative to the
case where it would be better to invest and reveal later, due to reputational cost
savings.
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Resumo
Projetos de Investigac¸a˜o & Desenvolvimento (I&D) comportam va´rios fatores de
risco. Nomeadamente, esta˜o associados a dois tipos de incerteza. Incerteza es-
toca´stica, relacionada com o cash flow esperado do projeto e incerteza probabil´ıstica,
que capta a probabilidade da inovac¸a˜o acontecer. Ale´m disso, investimentos em I&D
sa˜o pass´ıveis de ser escondidos do mercado. Por vezes as empresas optam por revelar
o investimento no momento em que o fazem, outras vezes optam por esperar algum
tempo, nalguns casos nunca chegam a revelar que o fizeram em caso de fracasso da
investigac¸a˜o e noutros ate´ optam por sinalizar ao mercado a intenc¸a˜o de investir
antes de o fazer. A decisa˜o de revelar um investimento em I&D e´ uma ferramenta
poderosa que os gestores deteˆm para maximizar o valor das suas empresas e sobre
a qual deteˆm flexibilidade. Por isso, esta e´ uma opc¸a˜o para a empresa que deve ser
exercida no momento o´timo.
Desenvolvemos, enta˜o, um modelo de opc¸o˜es reais com treˆs fases, onde procura-
mos demonstrar que a decisa˜o o´tima para o momento de revelac¸a˜o pode variar de
acordo com os paraˆmetros do modelo. As treˆs fases sa˜o: fase de benchmark ; fase
da opc¸a˜o composta (monopo´lio e competic¸a˜o exo´gena); e a fase das opc¸o˜es indepen-
dentes. Na primeira fase, e´ assumido que as duas opc¸o˜es sa˜o apenas uma e portanto
sempre exercidas ao mesmo tempo. Na segunda, considera-se que a opc¸a˜o de revelar
o investimento e´ recebida no momento em que se investe, pressuposto inspirado em
Delaney and Thijssen (2015). Dentro desta fase da opc¸a˜o composta, temos duas
diferentes abordagens. Na primeira, a empresa na˜o enfrenta qualquer concorreˆncia
e portanto estabelecemos que a empresa esta´ inserida num contexto monopol´ıstico.
Na segunda abordagem, assumimos que existe competic¸a˜o exo´gena sobre a opc¸a˜o
de revelar o investimento. Na u´ltima fase, abandonamos o pressuposto da opc¸a˜o
composta e permitimos que a empresa possa revelar informac¸a˜o antes de investir
caso esse seja o comportamento o´timo. Provamos que, dependendo dos paraˆmetros,
outras estrate´gias podem ser melhores que a de benchmark. Ale´m disso, tambe´m
encontramos evideˆncia teo´rica que demonstra que sempre que uma empresa deva
optar por revelar informac¸a˜o antes de investir, o momento o´timo para exercer a
opc¸a˜o de investir sera´ antecipado em relac¸a˜o ao caso em que e´ o´timo investir e so´
depois revelar, devido a` poupanc¸a de custos reputacionais.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An investment in an R&D project differs from a standard investment in what con-
cerns to its uncertainty. R&D investments have two sources of uncertainty: the
technological success of the R&D process; and the stochastic path of the potential
profit flow as time goes by. In our model, the technological uncertainty is captured
by an hazard rate similar to the one presented by Weeds (2002), the first model in
real options literature combining both kinds of uncertainties.
R&D investments also have the particularity of being easily hidden from the
market. Sometimes managers, because they do not want to reveal information that
could be an advantage to peer companies or just because they do not believe that
the optimal timing to reveal has already come, hide investments in R&D projects,
keeping this information private. Actually, sometimes managers hide investments
from the market until the new product is ready to be commercialized. But other
times, managers follow other strategies, like revealing the investment during the
R&D process or even before investing. Some examples of these different strategies
are the following:
• Google X, the department of Google responsible for R&D projects, has an-
nounced the development of the self-driving car, during the R&D process and
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in presence of technological uncertainty. On May 2016, Google announced a
partnership with Chrysler and the likelihood of innovation happen has clearly
increased in the recent past.
• Steve Jobs announced in 2010 that the iPad was developed before the iPhone.
Nevertheless, the announcement of the development of the iPad was postponed
until almost three years after the iPhone being launched. Steve Jobs realized
that the moment the iPad was ready to be commercialized was not even the
optimal timing to announce it.1
• Jean-Philippe Courtois, Microsoft International President, announced on April
7th 2011 that the company would invest around 8.64 billion USD in R&D in
the cloud strategy. This is a good example of an announcement about an
investment that would be done afterwards.
As one should realize, there are several strategies about the timing of revealing an
R&D investment and they should not be randomly decided, since they have impact
on the market value of the firm (Ba et al. (2013); Kelm et al. (1995); Woolridge and
Snow (1990)). This decision about the timing of revealing information is an option
for the manager of the firm. Once the information is revealed, the consequences can
be irreversible, with impact on a profit flow that is also uncertain and clearly the
manager has flexibility to choose the timing for revealing the information. For that
reason, it is also surprising why real options literature is scant on this topic.
Our model contemplates three steps. The first one will be the most intuitive
strategy. The firm invests and reveals the investment at the same time. We state this
as the benchmark strategy and it is in accordance with a full disclosure equilibrium
presented in seminal papers by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). The second
step is the compound option setting, inspired in the assumption of Delaney and
1This story also inspired Delaney and Thijssen (2015).
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Thijssen (2015), where we consider that the firm will only reveal information about
the R&D project after investing. This happens because the option to reveal is
received when the option to invest is exercised. Within this setting, we consider two
different approaches. The first one is the monopoly setting, where the firm does not
face any competition. The other one is the exogenous competition setting, where
the firm faces competition over the option to reveal the investment. Thus we expect
that in this setting the firm will tend to reveal sooner than in the monopoly setting,
as the likelihood of competition increases. Finally, in the last setting of the model
we abandon the assumption of Delaney and Thijssen (2015), to allow the firm, if
perceiving it as optimal, to reveal information about the investment opportunity,
even before investing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first academic work
to cover an announcement option about an R&D investment under Real Options
approach.
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature re-
view of the main topics of the dissertation, including R&D literature (real options
and voluntary disclosures), disclosure literature and announcement optionality lit-
erature. Chapter 3 presents the model and its implications. Chapter 4 concludes
the dissertation, presenting some discussion about the model, main conclusions and
future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Typically, an R&D investment is a risky one, since the firm undertakes a project
without knowing if it will get profit flow afterwards because the innovation may
never happen. Therefore, this kind of investment has clearly two sources of uncer-
tainty. On the one hand, there is uncertainty about the potential profit flow that
evolves stochastically as any other standard investment opportunity. On the other
hand, there is uncertainty regarding the technological success of the project, i.e. the
likelihood of innovation actually happen. This latter uncertainty has been modeled
in the literature as a Poisson arrival rate (see e.g.: Loury (1979), Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980), Reinganum (1983), Dixit (1988)). However,
the first paper combining both kinds of uncertainties, economical and technological,
in a single model was Weeds (2002). The author assumed the existence of a parame-
ter that captured the likelihood of a breakthrough taking place and called it hazard
rate.
Taking into consideration the features of an R&D project and also that this kind
of project might be hidden from the market or sometimes never be revealed, for
instance when discovery never happens, it is intuitive that revealing an investment
in R&D is a powerful tool for any firm and it should not be randomly managed.
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The objective now is to understand what, according to the literature, drives the
information release by the firms, especially about R&D investments.
One could wonder which impact regulatory requirements have on corporate dis-
closures. Beyer et al. (2010) argue that there is a lot of empirical evidence suggesting
a substantial part of information available to the market comes from voluntary dis-
closures. James (2011) defines voluntary R&D disclosure as ”information about the
nature of R&D activities such as the initiation of a research project, direction of a
research stream, intermediate R&D success, or strategic significance of R&D efforts.
Such disclosures occur in the pre-commercialization stage of the innovation process
and often prior to the filing of a patent application. Disclosure is voluntary because it
provides information that exceeds mandatory disclosure requirements by regulators
such as the FDA, the SEC, and the USPTO disclosure requirements. Moreover,
because managers control the content of these disclosures, they reflect managerial
choice, and are arguably more strategic.”
In the presence of R&D projects, voluntary disclosures clearly assume an im-
portant role. Woolridge and Snow (1990) analyzed the way in which a strategic
investment publicly announced, such as an R&D project disclosure, inter alia, has
impact in the stock prices. They found empirical evidence, analyzing 767 strategic
investment decisions announced by 248 companies in 102 industries, showing that
there is a positive reaction. The authors justify this result arguing, ”stock mar-
ket rewards managers for developing strategies that increase shareholder wealth”.
Kelm et al. (1995) also analyzed the impact of R&D announcements in the US
capital markets and among other things, concluded that markets positively reacted
to announcements like new information about both project continuations and new
product introductions in the case of well established industries, and also to project
initiation and project continuation announcements in the case of the biotechnology
industry. Ba et al. (2013) examined whether the stock market positively reacted to
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automaker’s announcements of global green vehicle innovations over the period 1996-
2009. The authors found a positive reaction of stock markets to those announce-
ments, even after controlling for firm size, leverage, profitability, R&D intensity and
oil price changes. Nekhili et al. (2012) also found empirical evidence showing that
voluntary R&D disclosure improves equity market value of the disclosing firm.
Since R&D investments are considered a huge source of agency problems, due
to the asymmetric information between managers and stakeholders and the great
uncertainty of the projects, R&D discretionary disclosure is a powerful tool that
can help managers maximize their firm’s value. Healy and Palepu (1993) showed
that more R&D disclosures reduce asymmetric information. Nagar et al. (2003)
claim that asymmetric information between managers and stakeholders can lead to
a non-reflection of R&D investments into stock prices. Therefore, R&D credible
disclosures are a powerful tool for managers.
All these findings inspired our model, as it will accommodate a positive reaction
to an R&D investment announcement made by the firm. An implicit assumption of
our model is that markets are efficient in the semi-strong form as it was early stated
by Malkiel and Fama (1970). So the market cannot observe any private investment
made by the firm until the information is publicly disclosed. In that moment, the
market will react and update its beliefs about the firm and its market value.
Although revealing an R&D investment will have a positive impact in the market
valuation of the firm, one could argue against that fact advocating that by reveal-
ing the investment in R&D, the firm clearly faces the risk of imitation and might
jeopardize the success of the project. James (2011) argued that, without need of
financing and in the absence of legal requirement, revealing an investment in R&D
might be a puzzle.
A lot of academic studies addressed this question and the results show that
depending on some features, like the business or the type of firm (see e.g.: Healy
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and Palepu (1993); Ahmed and Shehata (2015)), it might be beneficial to reveal an
investment. Ghnaya (2015) found empirical evidence proving that R&D strategy
disclosures are different depending on internationality degree, industry type, firm
size and R&D intensity. De Fraja (1993) showed that technological leaders, firms
with technological advance, tend to disclose more R&D processes, because the ben-
efits of deterring R&D competition outweigh the costs of being imitated. However,
for firms that are technological followers, the costs are more likely to cancel out
the benefits. Bag and Dasgupta (1995) argued that the type of firm influences the
speed of success of the R&D process, because some firms are more likely to make
innovation happen once they have higher hazard rates and found that if the success
occurs in the beginning of the process, the firm is more likely to be one of those with
higher hazard rates and reveal the success. In this case, by revealing the success,
the firm will drop out the peers in the R&D race.
Considering now the way how firms disclose R&D information, Li et al. (2014)
found empirical evidence from China showing that the firm’s value vary depending
on the methods chosen to reveal R&D investments. Specifically, the firms that
chose to capitalize their R&D investments have higher stock price and return. On
the contrary, the companies that would rather expense their R&D expenditures have
lower stock price and return. James (2011) argues that the way in which disclosure
is done impacts market reaction. The author showed that strategic disclosures
create value for the company, creating a sustainable advantage and discouraging
the imitators and peer’s patenting applications.
Literature is extensive explaining why R&D disclosures happen. Jones (2007)
points out three important reasons: information asymmetry, proprietary costs and
firm characteristics. A literature review made by Beyer et al. (2010) also pointed out
proprietary costs, liquidity and cost of capital, as reasons for information disclosures.
Information asymmetry happens when the manager has access to firm-specific in-
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formation before the market. This information will become public most of the times
either as time goes by or through an information disclosure (Dierkens et al. 1991).
Regarding the liquidity, Beyer et al. (2010) found a lot of evidence in literature
showing that information disclosures decrease information asymmetries and conse-
quently the firm’s stock liquidity is increased. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show
that firms that have adopted a high quality reporting regime exhibited lower infor-
mation asymmetry reflected by lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volumes.
Tang (2014) argues providing theoretical evidence that as the uncertainty about the
project is reduced by the disclosure of information, consequently the cost of capital
should be reduced. Coller and Yohn (1997) found evidence showing that voluntary
disclosures are higher when a firm’s bid-ask spread is larger than the rival in the
previous period relative to the disclosure.
Suijs (2005) defines proprietary costs as the ones that a firm incurs as the oppo-
nents react to information disclosure. For instance, if after an earnings announce-
ment, a new firm enters in the market, the market share that goes to that firm
is a proprietary cost. Seminal works of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) in
disclosure literature assumed that managers follow a full disclosure policy, because
if they did not, the market would discount the value of the firm, once it would ex-
pect the worst about the hidden information. But this is not a realistic conclusion.
For instance, several authors argued that a manager would only disclose proprietary
information when the increase in the firm’s value exceeded those proprietary costs
((Dye 1985); (Jovanovic 1982); (Verrecchia 1983)). Therefore sometimes it might be
optimal for a manager to reveal information if by doing so, proprietary costs can be
avoided. James and Shaver (2008) stated that firms with technological advantages
have incentives to reveal R&D investments in order to deter competition and avoid
proprietary costs. Moreover, Jones (2007) found that higher proprietary costs are
associated with lower levels of information revealed about R&D investments in a
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study with a sample of 119 R&D-intensive firms. On the other hand, Choi (1991)
argued that success in an R&D project can be seen as good news to the peers, since
it will encourage the firm to continue the process, in the sense of ”if you can do
that, why not me?”’. This argument clearly supports the idea that more disclosures
would increase the proprietary costs. Suijs (2005) presented the existence of two
costs, this proprietary cost and also a disclosure cost that has been earlier presented
by Verrecchia (1983). The disclosure cost is the fixed cost of releasing information.
Its existence is indispensable for the equilibrium we find in Suijs (2005) and without
it, the equilibrium on this model would be just the same as in Wagenhofer (1990).
A complementary study was presented by Coff et al. (2007) in which they found
other strategic reasons for voluntary R&D disclosures. The reasons are the need
for complementary resources, exploitation of some advantages such as, for instance,
marketing or secure licensing agreements and managerial opportunism, whereby
timing of releasing information is considered crucial for the manager’s wealth.
Since disclosing an R&D investment is part of a huge field in the literature
about corporate disclosures, we find it interesting to analyze the most important
determinants of corporate disclosures. Beyer et al. (2010) present some of the reasons
for voluntary disclosures discussed in the literature.
The first one is related to the capital market transactions. After earnings an-
nouncements, i.e. in the presence of good information, which increases the firm’s
value, firms are most likely to issue equity, because managers believe firms in those
cases might be overpriced (Korajczyk et al. 1991). The same happens when compa-
nies use equity to finance their acquisition (Ge and Lennox 2011).
Another reason is the stock-based compensation and corporate control contests.
Sometimes managers disclose or hide information in order to avoid shareholder’s
reaction. Of course, at the limit, if the manager is the owner of the company, this
problem does not exist but the disclosure discussion still remains. Noe (1999) pre-
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sented empirical evidence showing that after good news announcements managers
tend to sell more shares than after bad news announcements and buy more after
bad news announcements than good news releases. Moreover, managers also benefit
from having options over the firm’s stocks and tend to time information disclo-
sure according to their own benefit (Aboody and Kasznik 2000). Kothari et al.
(2009) found empirical evidence showing that managers tend to delay the release of
bad news in comparison to good news. The paper argues that good information is
quickly disclosed, whereas bad information is usually withheld. The authors argued
that the agency conflict given by the misalignment between managerial and share-
holders’ disclosure preferences might be one of the most important reasons for this
phenomenon.
The relation between agency costs and information disclosure has been deeply
discussed on literature. Lo et al. (2010) found empirical evidence showing that
an advanced quality corporate governance, given by the percentage of independent
directors, percentage of parent directors and having financial experts on audit com-
mittees, reduces the manipulation on earnings announcements. Chung et al. (2015)
also found that firms making more comprehensive information disclosures, in the
presence of high quality corporate governance, alleviate agency conflicts. Since we
are now able to recognize the importance of agency costs when dealing with the
question of information disclosure, we also want to point out an important paper
that presents a model under the real options methodology. Grenadier and Wang
(2005) present a model on whether managers, taking into account the existence of
agency conflicts and information asymmetries, time investment or not. The model
finds theoretical evidence for greater inertia regarding investment timing since the
manager’s option to wait is more valuable than the owner’s. Moreover, in order to
show the pertinence of a real options model to the disclosure topic, we present you
the evidence found by Graham et al. (2005). This paper shows that managers hide
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information because they believe that something better can happen in the future.
Intuitively, managers wait to disclose bad information, expecting that uncertain
future bring better news.
When a manager faces information disclosures, he has to be aware of the impact
in terms of reputation. Every time managers hide information, they might face
litigation risk. Skinner (1994) points out litigation risk as a motivation for managers
to quickly reveal bad information, in order to avoid lawsuits. However, Nagar et al.
(2003) defend that career concerns might motivate managers to hide bad information
and gamble that subsequent corporate events will allow them to hide the information
forever. Once again, managers expecting better news coming from the uncertain
future. Somehow, managers face a trade-off between reputation cost and litigation
risk.
The decision to voluntarily reveal an investment in R&D or any other information
has a flavor of optionality. Real options literature has made a scarce approach to this
issue. The first paper to recognize the announcement option was Dempster (2006).
The author addressed the problem with a practical case and considered that the
announcement would increase the volatility of the underlying profit flow. Therefore,
the additional value created by the announcement would come from the increase
of volatility. It is surprising that this option was only addressed in real options
literature so recently. As Delaney and Thijssen (2015) argued, the announcement
option has three important characteristics: it is irreversible, the payoff is uncertain
and in the case of an R&D investment has two sources on uncertainty, and finally the
manager has clear flexibility upon the timing to disclose the information. Related to
our work, the model by Delaney and Thijssen (2015) considered the option to disclose
as a compound option, acquired after exercising the investment. The manager would
only reveal the investment after receiving a certain number of net positive signals
coming from the market. To the best of our knowledge, there is no academic work
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addressing the option to disclose an R&D investment using real options methodology
and this is the gap we want to cover in the literature.
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Chapter 3
The Model
The decision-taker, the firm, has two related options, to invest and to reveal the
investment. The firm needs to decide when it is optimal to exercise each of them.
The most intuitive and obvious strategy regarding the revelation of the investment
is to communicate it to the market immediately after investing. Thus, we would say
that a natural strategy is to have both options exercised at the same time. As long
as the firm invests, it will reveal the action to the market. We expose this strategy in
the benchmark setting. We will show that other strategies might be optimal relative
to the benchmark strategy depending on the relevant parameters of the model and
the optimal stopping regions.
Inspired in Delaney and Thijssen (2015) we will consider the option to invest
and to reveal the investment in a compound option setting: the option to reveal an
investment is received when the firm invests.1 Consequently, the alternative strategy
is to consider the existence of two different optimal timings to invest and to reveal
the investment. The intuition is straightforward. The firm invests and hides the
1A nice argument to support this compound option approach is related to the internal policy
of releasing information of a firm. According to James (2011), some managers assume that only
release information about R&D projects, when the product is ready to be launched. So it is not
totally unrealistic assume that a firm will only reveal information about a project after investing,
although sometimes it can be optimal to do it before.
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action from the market, until the moment that it is optimal to reveal it.
Then, we extend the model considering the existence of exogenous competition
over the option to reveal the investment. In other words, the model accommodates a
new parameter that captures the likelihood of a peer company publicly announcing
to the market an investment in a project on the same business opportunity before
the firm. If a peer does so, the option to reveal the investment in that specific project
becomes worthless, since the impact of being an innovator from the viewpoint of the
market disappears, even if the firm announces the investment after the peer. The
market will not react to a second announcer, since this latter is perceived as an
imitator with lower probability of success on the R&D process.
Finally, we extend the model abandoning the assumption of the compound op-
tion. Assuming that sometimes it might be optimal to release information about
an investment opportunity before investing, we will present the independent options
setting. This turn, we no longer consider that the option to reveal is received after
the option to invest being exercised, but both options are just related.
3.1 The benchmark setting
The model will be developed through a contingent claim analysis, early presented
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and the profit flow X is assumed to follow a geometric
Brownian motion (gBm):
dX = αXdt+ σXdz (3.1)
where α is the growth rate of profit flow, σ represents its standard deviation and dz
is the increment of Wiener process.
In order to solve our conundrum, we need to start by computing the value of the
active project. In other words, the value of the project after investing and revealing
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the investment might be found solving the following ordinary differential equation
(ODE):
1
2
σ2X2V ′′(X) + αXV ′(X)− rV (X)− c− k + h
(
X
r − α − V (X)
)
= 0 (3.2)
where c is an R&D continuous cost, that starts at the moment the firm invests
and lasts until the innovation happens,2 k is a reputational cost that starts at the
moment the firm reveals the investment to the market and will cease to exist when
the innovation happens,3 r is the risk-free rate of return and V (X) is the value of
the active R&D project. The last term of the left-hand side of the equation (3.2)
captures the probabilistic uncertainty about this option, where h is the parameter
that captures the likelihood of the innovation happening. If the breakthrough hap-
pens, the firm will start receiving cash flows from the new product by the amount of
X
r − α . The parameter h follows a Poisson distribution. This parameter is similar to
the hazard rate presented by Weeds (2002). The solution that satisfies the equation
(3.2) and gives us the value of the active R&D project is
V (X) = C1X
β1 + C2X
β2 +
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
c+ k
r + h
(3.3)
We assume that once the option is exercised, the process will only end up when
the innovation happens, therefore there is no additional flexibility.4 Thus, the con-
stants C1 and C2 are set equal to zero, and the value of the active project is:
V (X) =
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
c+ k
r + h
(3.4)
2These R&D costs are the ones that the firm has to pay to keep the R&D process alive, such
as maintenance of the investigation laboratory, scientific costs, among others.
3The intuition behind this reputational cost is straightforward. If the manager of the firm
reveals something that afterwards will not happen, firm’s value might be decreased. Nagar et al.
(2003) provides good insights on this issue.
4Weeds (2002) presented the same assumption.
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At this time, it would be interesting to highlight that the value of the active
project after investing and without revealing it to the market is the same but not
considering the reputational cost, given by the parameter k. Please notice that the
expected value of the continuous costs, both R&D and reputational, are decreasing
as the probability of innovating increases.
After computing the value of the active R&D project, V (X), we can find the
value of the option to invest and to reveal the investment at the same time, and its
optimal trigger. In the benchmark setting, both options are considered an unique
one. Let B(X) represent the value of the option to invest and reveal. B(X) should
satisfy the following ODE:
1
2
σ2X2B′′(X) + αXB′(X)− rB(X) = 0 (3.5)
The solution for this ODE is well-known and is stated as follows:
B(X) = A1X
β1 + A2X
β2 (3.6)
where, β1 and β2 are respectively the positive and negative roots of the fundamental
quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) + αβ − r = 0 (3.7)
Therefore, the equations of β1 and β2 are:
β1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2
r
σ2
> 1 (3.8)
β2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2
r
σ2
< 0 (3.9)
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Since all the options we will value in this model are typically american call
options, the first boundary condition of all models will be similar to the one in
equation (3.10). Since β2 is negative, we need to ensure that every time X increases,
the value of the option will also increase, so we state the constant A2 equal to 0.
B(0) = 0 (3.10)
This assumption will follow us in all the models addressed henceforth. Thus the
value of the option takes the form:
B(X) = AXβ (3.11)
being A ≡ A1 and β ≡ β1 henceforth.
Since two unknowns are still remaining to be determined, B(X), the value of the
option, and X∗B, the trigger which determines what is the optimal timing to exercise
the option, we need to state the two additional boundary conditions. Equation (3.12)
is the value-matching condition and represents the value of the option at the moment
the firm invests and reveals. In other words, it is the value of the active project net of
the fixed cost of investment, I, and the fixed cost of releasing information, K,5 and
also considering the incremental and discrete benefit of revealing the investment to
the market, captured by the multiplier (1+γ).6 Equation (3.13) is the first derivative
of equation (3.12) and it is the so-called smooth-pasting condition.
B(X∗B) = (1 + γ)
h
h+ r − α
X∗B
r − α −
c+ k
r + h
− I −K (3.12)
B′(X∗B) = (1 + γ)
h
(h+ r − α)(r − α) (3.13)
5The fixed cost of releasing information has been discussed in literature. For instance, Suijs
(2005) presented this parameter in his model.
6This incremental benefit from revealing an investment in R&D that impacts the firm’s market
value is well documented in the literature (Ba et al. (2013); Kelm et al. (1995); Woolridge and Snow
(1990)). We will assume, for ease of exposition and without loss of generality, that the incremental
benefit (1 + γ) will impact on the profit flow.
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Applying both equations (3.12) and (3.13) to equation (3.11), we find the trigger
X∗B and the value function B(X).
X∗B =
β
β − 1
(h+ r − α)(r − α)
(1 + γ)h
(
c+ k
r + h
+ I +K
)
(3.14)
B(X) =

(
(1 + γ)
h
h+ r − α
X∗B
r − α −
c+ k
r + h
− I −K
)(
X
X∗B
)β
, X < X∗B
(1 + γ)
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
c+ k
r + h
− I −K ,X > X∗B
(3.15)
3.2 The compound option setting
3.2.1 Monopoly
According to what was stated by Delaney and Thijssen (2015), we assume that
the option to reveal the investment will only be received at the moment the firm
invests, transforming this conundrum in a compound option problem. Consequently,
the problem will be solved backwards, starting by valuing the option to reveal the
investment.
Let D(X) define the value of the option to reveal the investment, and X∗D,
the trigger value for revealing it. Moreover, both options to invest and reveal the
investment are considered to take a similar form to equation 3.11, because they are
american call options. The boundary conditions are the following:
D(X∗D) = γ
h
h+ r − α
X∗D
r − α −
k
r + h
−K (3.16)
D′(X∗D) = γ
h
(h+ r − α)(r − α) (3.17)
First, we should clarify why condition given by equation (3.10) also applies to
the option to reveal an R&D investment. If the value of the profit flow of the
project tends to zero, the project is worthless. So the option to reveal something
without value is also worthless. Then, equations (3.16) and (3.17) are once again
respectively the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The former reflects
18
the change in the firm’s value when the optimal timing to reveal the investment
arrives. Thus after revealing the investment, the firm receives the incremental value
due to reputational benefits as a function of the state variable given by the parameter
γ, but faces an additional reputational cost given by parameter k. The firm also
needs to pay the fixed cost for disclosing information.
Substituting equations (3.16) and (3.17) in a equation similar to (3.11), we can
determine the constants A and X∗D. The solutions for the disclosing trigger value
X∗D and the value of the option to reveal the investment given by D(X) are
X∗D =
β
β − 1
(h+ r − α)(r − α)
γh
(
k
r + h
+K
)
(3.18)
D(X) =

(
γ
h
h+ r − α
X∗D
r − α −
k
r + h
−K
)(
X
X∗D
)β
, X < X∗D
γ
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
k
r + h
−K ,X > X∗D
(3.19)
We already have the value of the option to reveal information and the trigger
value to do it. Now we can move backwards and compute the value function for
investing in the first place and its optimal timing. Let F (X) define the value of the
option to invest and X∗F its trigger value. F (X) takes a similar form to equation
(3.11). The boundary conditions that will lead us to find the solutions for the
unkown variables are defined as follows:
F (X∗F ) =
h
h+ r − α
X∗F
r − α −
c
r + h
− I +D(X∗F ) (3.20)
F ′(X∗F ) =
h
(h+ r − α)(r − α) +D
′(X∗F ) (3.21)
The equation (3.20) is the value-matching condition and states the NPV of this
investment opportunity in the optimal timing to invest. The firm receives the ex-
pected profit flow plus the option to reveal the investment, but spends a given
investment cost captured by parameter I, and R&D expenses given by parameter c.
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Equation (3.21) represents the smooth-pasting condition. Applying the boundary
conditions in the general solution, we find the equations for the trigger value X∗F
and the value function F (X):
X∗F =

β
β − 1
(h+ r − α)(r − α)
h
(
c
r + h
+ I
)
, X∗F < X
∗
D
X∗B , X
∗
F > X∗D
(3.22)
F (X) =

(
h
h+ r − α
X∗F
r − α −
c
r + h
− I +D(X∗F )
)(
X
X∗F
)β
, X < XF ∗ < X∗D
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
c
r + h
− I +D(X) , X∗F < X < X∗D
(1 + γ)
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
c+ k
r + h
− I −K ,X > X∗F > X∗D
(3.23)
Every time X∗F > X∗D, the firm will reveal the investment immediately after
exercising the option to invest. At that moment the benchmark trigger is applied.
The upper branch of X∗F in equation (3.22) will be used when it is optimal to invest
and still keep the option to reveal the investment alive.
Sensitivity analysis to monopoly setting
After introducing the first step of the model, we find it interesting to present a
sensitivity analysis to this monopoly setting, in order to check how the model works
in a dynamic way. Our decision factors are the trigger values, since the firm should
take the respective action whenever the correspondent trigger value is achieved.
Table 3.1 summarizes our numerical assumptions for the basic parameters of the
model. The assumptions are arbitrarily chosen and based on our best economic
intuition.
Applying the numerical assumptions, we find the value of the benchmark trigger,
X∗B, equal to 27.58. In the monopoly setting, we find the investment trigger, X
∗
F ,
equal to 27.25 and the revealing trigger, X∗D, equal to 30.29. As one may see, since
X∗F < X
∗
D, the firm should invest and hide the investment from the market until it
is optimal to reveal it.
20
Parameters Symbol Assumption
Risk-free rate of return r 5%
Growth rate of profit flow α 2%
Profit flow uncertainty σ 30%
Hazard rate h 0.35
R&D cost c 50
Investment cost I 100
Incremental benefit from revealing γ 12%
Reputational cost k 10
Fixed cost of revealing information K 5
Table 3.1: Numerical assumption for model application
Once the basic parameters of the model can vary within a reasonable range of
values, we will run an analytical sensitivity analysis in order to check the behavior
of the triggers, when each parameter varies and the implications in the optimal
strategy for the firm.
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Figure 3.1: Impact of volatility on trigger values in monopoly setting
Figure 3.1 presents a sensitivity analysis where we allow the uncertainty about
the profit flow to vary. As it is well established in the real options literature, as
the uncertainty increases, the trigger value of an American call option should also
increase. It is what happens in this Figure 3.1. Moreover, applying these values,
no matter how much the level of uncertainty about the profit flow is, within the
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considered range of values, the firm should always invest and wait to reveal the
investment to the market.
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Figure 3.2: Impact of hazard rate on trigger values in monopoly setting
In figure 3.2, the parameter analyzed is h, the mean arrival rate of innovation
that captures the technological uncertainty of the project, the so called hazard rate.
As h increases, all triggers decrease, since it is more likely the R&D process will
generate profit in the future. An interesting conclusion of this analysis is linked to
the existence of two regions. For lower values of h, the firm will invest and wait
to reveal that to the market. However, for higher values of h, it becomes optimal
to reveal as soon as the investment is made. The result is economically intuitive,
because higher values of h represent lower technological uncertainty. Thus, the
innovation is imminent and there is no advantage in hiding the investment from the
market.
Figure 3.3 analyses the behavior of the R&D cost, given by the parameter c. In
analytical terms, this parameter present a similar behavior to the fixed investment
cost I and, consequently, similar graphics. For that reason, henceforth we will only
analyze one of them.
As one should be expecting, X∗D is absolutely independent of the R&D cost. X
∗
F
and X∗B increase as c increases. Therefore, whenever X
∗
F < X
∗
D, the firm will invest
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Figure 3.3: Impact of R&D cost on trigger values in monopoly setting
and keep the option to reveal alive until it is optimal to do so. Otherwise, X∗B is
optimally applied.
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Figure 3.4: Impact of incremental benefit from disclosing on trigger values in
monopoly setting
The parameter γ, the incremental benefit from disclosing information, is analyzed
in figure 3.4. The upper branch of X∗F is totally independent of γ. So, every time
X∗F < X
∗
D, the firm should invest and wait to reveal and, in this region, X
∗
F is
constant. Otherwise, X∗B is applied and X
∗
F starts decreasing as γ increases.
Both parameters k and K also have similar analysis and plots, so we will only
present the analysis of one of them henceforth. As expected, figure 3.5 shows that
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Figure 3.5: Impact of reputational cost on trigger values in monopoly setting
X∗D increases with k. For lower values of k, X
∗
B is applied. When X
∗
F < X
∗
D, the
firm will invest, hiding the information until it is optimal to reveal.
3.2.2 Exogenous competition setting
Competition is a very important field within real options literature. So important we
cannot ignore it. The focus of our model is clearly to find the optimal timing to reveal
the investment to the market. Until now, we have been assuming the firm does not
face any competition. Nevertheless, this might not be a fully realistic assumption.
If there is any chance of a competitor to arrive and become the innovator from the
viewpoint of the market, the firm should clearly adapt the timing of revealing the
investment. Intuitively, facing competition the firm should reveal sooner than in
the monopoly setting. In other words, the firm will anticipate the announcement,
requiring a lower trigger value for revealing the investment.
How should we accommodate this possible competition over the option to reveal
the investment? This option no longer satisfies the ODE in equation (3.5). Let
DC(X) be the new value function for the option to reveal an investment in R&D,
in presence of exogenous competition. DC(X) should satisfy the new ODE that is
presented in equation (3.24):
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σ2D′′C(X) + αXD
′
C(X)− rDC(X) + λ(0−DC(X)) = 0 (3.24)
The solution for this ODE is
DC(X) = W1X
η1 +W2X
η2 (3.25)
where W1 and W2 are constants to be determined and η1 and η2 are respectively the
positive and negative roots of the fundamental quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2η(η − 1) + αη − (r + λ) = 0 (3.26)
Therefore, the equations of η1 and η2 are
η1 =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2
r + λ
σ2
> 1 (3.27)
η2 =
1
2
− α
σ2
−
√(
α
σ2
− 1
2
)2
+ 2
r + λ
σ2
< 0 (3.28)
The boundary conditions are stated as follows:
DC(0) = 0 (3.29)
DC(XD
∗
C) = γ
h
h+ r − α
XD
∗
C
r − α −
k
r + h
−K (3.30)
D′C(XD
∗
C) = γ
h
(h+ r − α)(r − α) (3.31)
Equation (3.29) has a similar interpretation of equation (3.10). The second
and third boundary conditions are equal to the previous setting. But, this time,
equations (3.29), (3.30) and (3.31) are applied in equation (3.25). Thus, we find the
disclosing trigger value XD
∗
C and the value function for revealing the investment in
the presence of exogenous competition DC(X),
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XD
∗
C =
η
η − 1
(h+ r − α)(r − α)
γh
(
k
r + h
+K
)
(3.32)
DC(X) =

(
γ
h
h+ r − α
XD
∗
C
r − α −
k
r + h
−K
)(
X
XD
∗
C
)η
, X < XD
∗
C
γ
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
k
r + h
−K ,X > XD∗C
(3.33)
being η ≡ η1.
Now we need to proceed backwards as in the previous setting in order to compute
the value of the option to invest. Boundary conditions similar to the ones presented
in the previous setting apply again, but this turn, we need to use the value function
for revealing in equation (3.33) instead of equation (3.19). Then, both the second
and third boundary conditions are stated as follows:
FC(XF
∗
C) =
h
h+ r − α
XF
∗
C
r − α −
c
r + h
− I +DC(XF ∗C) (3.34)
F ′C(XF
∗
C) =
h
(h+ r − α)(r − α) +D
′
C(XF
∗
C) (3.35)
The reasoning behind these equations is the same as in the previous setting.
Applying equation (3.34) and (3.35) in a similar equation to (3.11), we find the
investing trigger XF
∗
C and the value function FC(X). The investing trigger, in the
region XF
∗
C < XD
∗
C , should be found numerically by solving the equation:
(β − 1) h
h+ r − α
XF
∗
C
r − α + (β − η)DC(XF
∗
C) = β
(
c
r + h
+ I
)
(3.36)
In the region XF
∗
C > XD
∗
C , as one may expect, X
∗
B is applied. The value function
is given by:
FC(X) =

(
h
h+ r − α
XF
∗
C
r − α −
c
r + h
− I +DC(XF ∗C)
)(
X
XF
∗
C
)β
, X < XF
∗
C < XD
∗
C
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
c
r + h
− I +DC(X) , XF ∗C < X < XD∗C
(1 + γ)
h
h+ r − α
X
r − α −
c
r + h
− I −K ,XD∗C < XF ∗C < X
(3.37)
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Table 3.2: Considering the four optimal stopping regions, this is the correspond-
ing firm’s value at each stage
As one should realize, depending on the optimal stopping regions for both op-
tions, the value of the project for the company varies according to what is exposed
in Table 3.2.
Sensitivity analysis to exogenous competition setting
At this moment it is interesting to apply the model again, adding the new equations
for trigger values in the exogenous competition setting and assess the effect of com-
petition in our model. We will assume again all the values presented in Table 1 and
make an additional assumption: λ is equal to 0.05. Applying those values, the new
result for XF
∗
C is 27.58 and for XD
∗
C is 18.4. The benchmark trigger, X
∗
B, is 27.58.
The optimal timing for revealing the investment drastically decreases, because
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now the firm faces competition over this option and, consequently, X∗B is optimally
applied. In this numerical example, the investment will be undertaken later than in
the previous setting.
An analytical sensitivity analysis will allow us to scrutinize the dynamics and
robustness of the model.
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Figure 3.6: Impact of volatility on trigger values - comparison between
monopoly and exogenous competition settings
Figure 3.6 represents a sensitivity analysis allowing σ to vary from 15% to 45%.
The first conclusion is that all triggers increase as the uncertainty level increases.
But in this analysis, more interesting than that, is to check the impact competition
has in the decision the firm should make. Comparing X∗D with XD
∗
C , one can easily
realize that the optimal timing to release information drastically drops. So, in the
monopoly strategy the firm should invest and wait to reveal. In the exogenous
competition setting, X∗B is optimally applied.
In figure 3.7, we analyze the trigger’s behavior, allowing h to vary. In the exoge-
nous competition setting, X∗B is always applied. The same does not happen in the
monopoly setting where X∗B will only be applied for high values of h.
Figure 3.8 reflects the analysis of the parameter I, the fixed investment cost.
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Figure 3.7: Impact of hazard rate on trigger values - comparison between
monopoly and exogenous competition settings
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Figure 3.8: Impact of investment cost on trigger values - comparison between
monopoly and exogenous competition settings
Both X∗D and XD
∗
C are independent of I. X
∗
B, X
∗
F and XF
∗
C increase as I increases.
Due to the effect of competition, X∗D > XD
∗
C , so X
∗
B is applied sooner in the exoge-
nous competition setting.
Our basic parameter γ is analyzed in figure 3.9. The upper branch of X∗F is
the only line independent of γ. Once again, X∗B is applied sooner in the exogenous
competition setting. The option to reveal will only be kept alive after investing, for
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really low values of γ.
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Figure 3.9: Impact of incremental benefit from disclosing on trigger values -
comparison between monopoly and exogenous competition settings
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Figure 3.10: Impact of reputational cost on trigger values - comparison between
monopoly and exogenous competition settings
Figure 3.10 shows the triggers’ behavior depending on the value of the disclosing
costs. According to what would be intuitive and expected, the lower these costs are,
the sooner the firm will be able to reveal information about the R&D investment, so
X∗B is optimally applied. As disclosing costs increase, it becomes optimal to invest
and keep the option to reveal alive. Due to the existence of the parameter λ, X∗B is
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applied during more time in the exogenous competition setting.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
10
20
30
40
50
λ
Tr
ig
ge
r
V
al
ue
Figure 3.11: Impact of likelihood of exogenous competition on trigger values
- comparison between monopoly and exogenous competition set-
tings
Both figures 3.11 and 3.12 analyze the effect λ, the likelihood of exogenous
competition appear and make the option to reveal worthless for the firm, has on
triggers. For λ equal to 0, X∗D and XD
∗
C have the same value. Then, as λ increases
XD
∗
C decreases and X
∗
D remains constant. The optimal strategy for the firm is
determined by the behavior of investment triggers. In figure 3.11, it seems that
it is always optimal to invest keeping the option to reveal alive in the monopoly
setting, and X∗B is almost always optimal for the exogenous competition setting.
For that reason, we present figure 3.12, where we increase the parameter K, the
fixed cost of producing and releasing information, from 5 to 25. The goal is to
increase disclosing triggers when compared with figure 3.11. In figure 3.12, in the
exogenous competition setting, for low values of λ, the firm should invest and wait
to reveal the investment.
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Figure 3.12: Impact of likelihood of exogenous competition on trigger values
- comparison between monopoly and exogenous competition set-
tings, with a numerical assumption changed
3.3 Independent options setting
So far, one of the most important assumptions of our model is linked to the com-
pound option inspired in Delaney and Thijssen (2015). The option to reveal the
investment is received when the firm exercises the option to invest. Therefore, the
firm will both invest and reveal at the same time, in the case the benchmark trigger
is applied or wait for revealing the investment, keeping the option alive. Until now
we have been implicitly assuming that a firm will never reveal information about
an R&D investment opportunity before exercising the option to invest. However,
this is not fully realistic. A firm might optimally disclose information about an
R&D investment opportunity, even before investing, for instance when it acquires a
patent, revealing it and waiting for the optimal timing to invest, or simply publicly
announces the will of investing in a specific project. Therefore, a firm has two differ-
ent options in the first place: an option to reveal information about the investment
opportunity and an option to invest and start the research process. Both options
are linked but they can be considered independent.
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Let’s start by addressing the option to reveal information and see what happens
when this option is the first one to be exercised. When both options are still alive
and it is optimal to reveal information about the investment opportunity to the
market, the incremental benefit given by the parameter γ impacts in the value of
the option to invest, f(x). Moreover, the firm not only has to pay a fixed cost of
revealing information, but also faces an additional reputational cost that this time
takes the form of a perpetuity, since it is not guaranteed the firm will ever invest.
If the firm actually invests afterwards, it will save on this reputational cost due to
the probability of becoming an innovator once the product is ready, captured by the
parameter h, as we will see later. In the case of the firm only reveals information
about the project after investing, the value of the project, at the moment it is
optimal to invest, takes the form of the active project without the parameter k. So
let d(x) be the value function for revealing and x∗d the trigger value for revealing
information. The boundary conditions are:
d(0) = 0 (3.38)
d(x∗d) =
γf(x
∗
d)−
k
r
−K ,x∗d < x∗f
γ
h
h+ r − α
x∗d
r − α −
k
r + h
−K ,x∗d > x∗f
(3.39)
d′(x∗d) =

γf ′(x∗d) , x
∗
d < x
∗
f
γh
(h+ r − α)(r − α) , x
∗
d > x
∗
f
(3.40)
These equations should be applied to equation (3.25), so we can find the revealing
trigger and the value function for revealing information. In the region x∗d < x
∗
f , the
trigger, x∗d, must be found by solving the following equation numerically:
(η − β)(1 + γ)f(x∗d) = η
(
k
r
+K
)
(3.41)
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On the other hand, in the region x∗d > x
∗
f , the trigger is the same as in the
equation (3.32), so XD
∗
C . Then, the value function for the option to reveal is:
d(x) =

(
γf(x∗d)−
k
r
−K
)(
x
x∗d
)η
, x < x∗d < x
∗
f(
γ
h
h+ r − α
x∗d
r − α −
k
r + h
−K
)(
x
x∗d
)η
, x < x∗f < x
∗
d
γf(x)− k
r
−K ,x∗d < x < x∗f
γ
h
h+ r − α
x
r − α − I , x
∗
f < x
∗
d < x
(3.42)
After addressing the option to release information, we need to find the value
function of the option to invest alone and find its optimal trigger. Similar equations
to (3.5), (3.10) and (3.11) are applied again. Let x∗f be the trigger value and f(x)
the value function for investing. The boundary conditions are stated as follows:
f(x∗f ) =

h
h+ r − α
x∗f
r − α −
c
r + h
− I + k h− rγ
r(r + h)(1 + γ)
, x∗d < x
∗
f
h
h+ r − α
x∗f
r − α −
c
r + h
− I , x∗d > x∗f
(3.43)
f ′(x∗f ) =
h
(h+ r − α)(r − α) (3.44)
Once again, we need to consider the two different regions: the region where infor-
mation is revealed before investing and otherwise. The second and third boundary
conditions must accommodate both situations, since the firm’s wealth will be dif-
ferent depending on which of the regions the firm is. In the first region, where it
is optimal to release information before investing, at the moment the firm invests,
not only receives the value of the active project paying a fixed investment cost,
but also saves in the reputational cost, which before investing is a perpetuity, and
after investing is reduced by k
h− rγ
r(r + h)(1 + γ)
. In the case, where it is optimal to
invest without saying anything to the market, the value-matching condition is equal
to the value of the active project without k and net of the fixed investment cost.
Substituting equations (3.43) and (3.44) in a similar equation to (3.11), we obtain
34
the trigger value, x∗f and the value function f(x):
x∗f =

β
β − 1
(h+ r − α)(r − α)
h
(
c
r + h
+ I − k h− rγ
r(r + h)(1 + γ)
)
, x∗d < x
∗
f
β
β − 1
(h+ r − α)(r − α)
h
(
c
r + h
+ I
)
, x∗d > x∗f
(3.45)
f(x) =

(
h
h+ r − α
x∗f
r − α −
c
r + h
− I + k h− rγ
r(r + h)(1 + γ)
)(
x
x∗f
)β
, x∗d < x < x
∗
f(
h
h+ r − α
x∗f
r − α −
c
r + h
− I
)(
x
x∗f
)β
, x < x∗f < x
∗
d
h
h+ r − α
x
r − α −
c
r + h
− I + k h− rγ
r(r + h)(1 + γ)
, x∗d < x
∗
f < x
h
h+ r − α
x
r − α −
c
r + h
− I , x∗f < x < x∗d
(3.46)
Equation (3.45) points out a very important conclusion. As triggers are con-
stants, every time the optimal stopping region is x∗d < x
∗
f , which will lead the firm
to reveal information before investing, x∗f will be lower than in the opposite region
x∗d > x
∗
f . This lead us to conclude that when the firm reveals information before
investing, the investment will be anticipated when compared to the situation when
the firm would only reveal after investing, due to the reputational costs saving.
Sensitivity analysis to exogenous competition and independent options
setting
Now, the firm can release information about the investment opportunity before
investing if it is optimal to do so. We will apply the model again to check the dy-
namics of these independent triggers and establish comparisons with the exogenous
competition setting, since both disclosing options are assumed to face exogenous
competition given by the parameter λ. Applying the numerical assumption, we find
the value for x∗f equal to 27.25 and for x
∗
d equal to 18.4. Comparing these results
with the previous ones, the first conclusion is that x∗d and XD
∗
C present the same
value. This will always happen, regardless the values of all parameters. In the ex-
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ogenous competition setting, the optimal strategy is to apply X∗B, when X is equal
to 27.58. This time the firm should invest when the expected profit flow is equal
to 27.25, the value of x∗f , so the investment is anticipated when compared to the
previous setting for these numerical application.
Running an analytical sensitivity analysis is considered important in order to
check the way compound option (exogenous competition) and independent options
settings match. The difference between both approaches might be linked to the
internal policy of releasing information of the firm. Here we show that flexibility
on this policy adds value to the firm because sometimes it can be optimal to reveal
information before investing.
The parameter σ is analyzed in both figure 3.13 and 3.14. The first one results
directly from the numerical application. As expected, all triggers increase, as the
uncertainty increases. Once again, XD
∗
C and x
∗
d are the same line and this will
happen for all graphics we present here, regardless the region triggers are. In the
case of Figure 3.13, in the compound option exogenous competition setting, X∗B
will always be applied. In the independent options setting, the firm will start by
revealing information about the project when x equals x∗d, and then invests later in
x∗f .
The goal of Figure 3.14 is to increase the amount of K, in order to increase both
disclosing triggers. Consequently, now we have two different regions. There is a first
region, for low values of uncertainty, in which the firm should invest and keep the
option to reveal information alive. For high levels of uncertainty, the firm adopts
the benchmark strategy in the compound option exogenous competition setting
and reveals the information before investing in the independent options setting.
The interlacement between disclosing and investing trigger happens sooner in the
compound option exogenous competition setting. As the uncertainty increases, the
difference between XF
∗
C and x
∗
f also increases, and x
∗
f is always lower than XF
∗
C .
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Figure 3.13: Impact of likelihood of volatility on trigger values - comparison
between exogenous competition and independent options settings
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Figure 3.14: Impact of likelihood of volatility on trigger values - comparison
between exogenous competition and independent options settings
The parameter h is addressed in Figure 3.15. As it should be expected, as
the likelihood of innovating increases, all triggers decrease. The strategies to be
adopted in this particular case derive from the numerical assumptions of the other
parameters.
The behavior of investment costs is well represented in Figure 3.16, where we
allow the parameter c to vary. The disclosing triggers are totally independent of
the value of investment costs. Both XF
∗
C and x
∗
f increase, as c also increases. For
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Figure 3.15: Impact of likelihood of hazard rate on trigger values - comparison
between exogenous competition and independent options settings
high values of c, X∗B will be optimally applied, in the compound option exogenous
competition setting.
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Figure 3.16: Impact of likelihood of R&D cost on trigger values - comparison
between exogenous competition and independent options settings
Figure 3.17 gives us the sensitivity analysis to the parameter γ. As it is expected
and it was proved already, disclosing triggers decrease, as γ increases. x∗f is totally
independent of γ. Thus, the analysis of the independent options setting is straight-
forward. In the compound option exogenous competition setting, the firm should
invest and wait to reveal that investment, for low values of γ. For high values of γ,
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X∗B will be applied, since the opportunity cost of keeping the option to reveal alive
increases.
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Figure 3.17: Impact of likelihood of incremental benefit from disclosing on trig-
ger values - comparison between exogenous competition and inde-
pendent options settings
The disclosing costs are analyzed in Figure 3.18. Both disclosing triggers, XD
∗
C
and x∗d, have a positive relation with parameter K. x
∗
f is totally independent of
K, which divides the independent options setting within two regions and makes the
interpretation very simple: one where the firm reveals information about the option
to invest and only invests afterwards , and the other where the investment is done
in the first place and then disclosed. Regarding the compound option exogenous
competition setting, it is easy to conclude that for low values of K, X∗B will be
applied, whereas for higher values of the same parameter, the firm should invest
and reveal it later.
The parameter λ is analyzed in both figures 3.19 and 3.20. Figure 3.19 derives
from the direct application of the numerical example. We can conclude from this
figure that x∗d decreases as λ increases due to the competition effect. X
∗
B and x
∗
f are
independent of λ, and so XF
∗
C remains constant across the range of values presented
here.
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Figure 3.18: Impact of likelihood of fixed cost of releasing information on trig-
ger values - comparison between exogenous competition and inde-
pendent options settings
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Figure 3.19: Impact of likelihood of likelihood of exogenous competition on
trigger values - comparison between exogenous competition and
independent options settings
But, what would happen if we increase the parameter K in order to increase
both disclosing triggers? Figure 3.20 represents that experiment and we can observe
that XF
∗
C changes with λ. Thus, for low values of λ, the firm should invest and keep
the option to reveal alive.
Table 3.3 presents a summary of the behavior of the trigger values when we
change the parameters of the model, presenting the sign of the derivatives, in accor-
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Figure 3.20: Impact of likelihood of likelihood of exogenous competition on trig-
ger values - comparison between exogenous competition and inde-
pendent options settings, with a numerical assumption changed
dance with what was already discussed in the analysis of the figures.
The numerical application of the model shows that depending upon the assump-
tions we consider, several strategies might be optimal. Therefore, managers should
consider all the possible strategies for revealing an investment in R&D and take the
best decision based on the prediction of the trigger values. Adding flexibility to the
releasing information policy increases the value of the firm. We proved that some-
times it might be optimal to reveal the information about an R&D project before
the investment itself.
X∗B XF
∗
C XD
∗
C x
∗
f x
∗
d
σ + + + + +
h - - - - -
c/I + + +
γ - ± - -
k/K + ± + +
λ ± - -
Table 3.3: Summary of the analytical sensitivity analysis
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
The aim of the dissertation was to build a theoretical model under real options
methodology, to explain the optionality about revealing an investment in R&D. As
it has been demonstrated over the last decades, revealing information is a powerful
tool for managers. When we are beyond an R&D investment opportunity, which
might be hidden from the market, the timing of revealing the investment is a strate-
gic decision that should be taken by the manager in the best interest of the firm and
its shareholders. The most intuitive strategy to follow is to reveal any investment
immediately after investing. The result is in accordance to the equilibrium found
in models of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981). However, it has been demon-
strated, and empirical evidence supports, that managers have flexibility to decide
upon other strategic timings to reveal investments.
Taking into consideration the relevant parameters that lead managers to choose
different strategies, according to the literature and using our best economic intuition,
we built a real options model with three different settings, showing that there are
several optimal stopping regions for revealing an investment. The first setting, we
stated as the benchmark. It is the simpler one, since both options are considered an
unique one. The firm invests and it is obliged to reveal at the same time. Both the
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second and third settings came to be compared with this benchmark strategy. The
second setting was defined as a compound option approach. We considered that the
firm, after investing, receives an option to reveal the investment. This assumption
was inspired in Delaney and Thijssen (2015). In the third setting, we added flex-
ibility to the policy of information disclosure of the firm, allowing announcements
about investment opportunities before the investment being undertaken.
The results of our model are conclusive. First of all, managers have incentives
to hide information from the market, when the benefits do not compensate the dis-
closing costs. Then, in the presence of exogenous competition over the option to
reveal the investment to the market, managers have incentives to anticipate the an-
nouncement, to guarantee the innovator position from the viewpoint of the market.
Finally, when we extended the model to the third setting where both options to
invest and reveal are considered independent, we observe that managers also might
have incentives to reveal information about an investment opportunity, even before
investing. We also proved that every time the firm rationally reveals information
before investing, the timing to invest will be anticipated due to reputational costs
saving.
Future research over this topic should incide in the effect of proprietary costs,
when the firm reveals information. Proprietary costs has been discussed in the
literature and were defined as the ones that affect the firm’s value, in consequence of
the behavior of the opponents, after an announcement made by the firm (Suijs 2005).
Thus, it would be interesting to continue this investigation, trying to capture how
the decision of announcing by the firm will impact the behavior of peer companies
and therefore the firm’s market value. Literature has proven that this is not a linear
relation. For instance, if the firm is R&D intensive and has technological advantage,
by revealing an investment in R&D, the firm can avoid proprietary costs. On the
other hand, if the technological advantage is on the side of peers, revealing the
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investment might be a bad strategy for the firm (De Fraja 1993). Nevertheless, other
features can also affect this relation as we discussed in the literature review. Thus,
incorporating the effect of proprietary costs in the analytical analysis of revealing
an investment in R&D is a complex task.
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